Politics

Fickle friends: Iranian, Russian forces abandoned Syrian regime

Frustrated with al-Assad and with their own forces diminished, Iran and Russia withheld critical support and intelligence ahead of regime's fall.

A portrait of Russia's President Vladimir Putin hangs next to the entrance to a building, reportedly used by the Russian army, in the Latakia province town of al-Bassah on December 12, 2024. [Aaref Watad/AFP]
A portrait of Russia's President Vladimir Putin hangs next to the entrance to a building, reportedly used by the Russian army, in the Latakia province town of al-Bassah on December 12, 2024. [Aaref Watad/AFP]

By Samah Abdul Fattah |

The Iranian regime and Russia had intelligence about the opposition assault that toppled the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, but delayed sharing critical information with Syria in a move that showed them to be unreliable allies.

Instead of rallying to al-Assad's defense, "both of them decided they would throw Syria under the bus and pull out," Sky News defense analyst Michael Clarke said in a December 8 analysis.

"Both Russia and Iran withdrew their forces and those loyal to them on the morning of the military operation mounted by the opposition, leaving the Syrian army at the forefront," military expert Yahya Muhammad Ali told Al-Fassel.

"As his forces dissolved around him, al-Assad watched helplessly as his longtime patrons, Russia and Iran, orchestrated their own withdrawals," said Nicole Grajewski of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"Both powers had grown increasingly frustrated with al-Assad’s intransigence," she wrote for the Diwan blog. "For Russia and Iran, al-Assad was their man until he wasn't."

"By the time rebels launched their offensive, neither Iran nor Russia saw sufficient value in expending further resources to prop up a regime that had become more liability than asset."

Unreliable allies

The Iranian regime's decision not to send forces to support al-Assad might have reflected a recognition of the regime's fatal weakness, or of its own weakness, Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox wrote December 8.

Similarly, Moscow's decision not to support al-Assad "may reflect weakness or simply distraction over Ukraine."

In March 6 reportage for New Lines Magazine, Syrian journalist Kamal Shahin revealed further details of the Iranian and Russian abandonment.

He spoke with a high-ranking Syrian officer who had worked in the Aleppo joint operations command, alongside Russian and Iranian military advisers, who said his unit had "confirmed intelligence of an imminent opposition attack on Aleppo."

"What the Syrian forces on the ground were unaware of, but the leadership knew, was that the small team of Russian advisers in the operations command had already planned to withdraw from the city," the officer told Shahin.

"This decision was made under direct orders from Gen. Sergei Kisel, the commander of Russian forces in Syria."

"Iranian leadership within the security zone had begun evacuating their headquarters and moving vehicles out of their compound as early as November 20," Shahin wrote.

"At 7:23 a.m. on November 27, Türkiye informed the Russians that the attack on Aleppo would begin within half an hour."

"The Russians took another 30 minutes before passing this information on to the Syrian command. Russian field commanders executed an emergency evacuation from Aleppo, gathering all documents and withdrawing to Kuweires Air Base with extreme haste."

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