Al-Fassel | 2025-12-08

Key militia groups like Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN), and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) were central to Tehran's strategy. They executed Tehran's agenda with blind obedience.

However, cracks are appearing in this approach as corruption, self-serving motives, and mismanagement among militia leaders undermine Iran’s political and strategic goals in Iraq.

Iraqi militia groups drift from Iranian control

Iran’s proxy network in Iraq, once famous for reshaping geopolitical realities, is now hampered by diminishing loyalty and effectiveness.

Groups such as KH, HAN, and AAH have deviated from their original role as steadfast supporters of Tehran's ambitions.

Increasingly unreliable, these militias prioritize their own financial and political interests over their commitment to Iran’s wider regional agenda.

The leadership of these groups is at the center of this drift. Leaders like Akram al-Kabi (HAN), Ahmad al-Hamidawi (KH), and Qays al-Khazali (AAH) were once trusted allies of Iran.

Today, they frequently clash with Iranian directives, diluting the cohesion and strategic focus of Iran’s proxy strategy.

This fragmentation has reduced Iran’s ability to unify its proxies against competing forces in Iraq, such as nationalist movements and Western interests.

Analysts note that Tehran’s failure to address the internal dysfunction within these militias has exacerbated its struggle for influence in an increasingly unstable landscape.

Iraq’s populace is also growing weary of militia-aligned groups, criticizing their role in perpetuating corruption and insecurity.

Corruption and self-interest

One of the most significant factors eroding Iran’s proxy network is the unchecked corruption among the leadership of KH, HAN, and AAH.

Originally empowered and financed by Iran, these groups have become notorious for siphoning Iranian funds for personal enrichment.

For example, militia leaders like Qays al-Khazali and Akram al-Kabi have focused on accumulating personal wealth through smuggling operations.

They also control lucrative territorial assets, prioritizing their self-interest over Iran's strategic goals.

This mismanagement not only alienates support for Iran among these groups but also erodes public trust.

Many Iraqis view these militias as opportunistic organizations that exploit ordinary citizens rather than protect them.

Iranian proxies, once significant tools of geopolitical influence, are increasingly being accused of perpetuating systemic oppression and instability in Iraq.

In conclusion, Iran’s proxy strategy in Iraq is losing traction, weighed down by internal corruption and fractured loyalties within its core militia groups.

KH, HAN, and AAH’s growing focus on self-serving interests is weakening Tehran’s longstanding control over its Iraqi network.

This shift could significantly alter Iraq’s political landscape in the future.