By Al-Fassel | 2025-04-08

The United States imposed sanctions April 1 on an Iran-UAE-China network supplying critical components to Tehran's military drone program, as part of ongoing efforts to curtail its weapons capabilities and support for proxies.

Two Iranian businessmen and their company, Rah Roshd International Trade Exchanges Development, face federal charges for procuring US technology for Iranian attack drones.

Rah Roshd chief executive Hossein Akbari and commercial manager Reza Amidi, a former Qods Aviation Industries (QAI) employee, are charged with money laundering and providing material support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Both remain at large.

The company contracted directly with US-sanctioned QAI -- the regime's premier drone manufacturer -- to supply crucial components, including servo motors for combat drones like the Mohajer-6.

A Mohajer-6 drone used by Russian forces was shot down in Ukraine in September 2022 and found to contain US-manufactured parts, according to AFP.

The network operated through entities including UAE-based Infracom Communication Networks FZE and Chinese manufacturer Zibo Shenbo Machinelectronics, the US Treasury said.

It channeled parts and electronic components worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Iranian regime's military-industrial complex, including the Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group.

Zibo Shenbo authorized Rah Roshd as its Iranian distributor, supplying thousands of motors for the end user SBIG, while Infracom facilitated procurement of servo motors between the manufacturer and Rah Roshd.

Iranian national Abbas Yousefnejad served as Rah Roshd's alternate inspector and parts procurer.

Devious procurement networks

A joint US government advisory issued in October 2023 details how Iranian procurement agents use front companies, falsified documents and complex financial schemes to acquire sensitive technology.

Shipments are typically routed through multiple countries using layers of intermediaries -- from state-owned entities to diplomatic representatives.

These intermediaries establish shell companies and foreign bank accounts to mask Iranian involvement, the advisory stated.

The IRGC exploits commercial relationships with international firms to acquire essential military components, attempting to bypass sanctions on Iranian oil exports and military industry imports, per military expert Yahya Muhammad Ali.

"The Iranian military-industrial complex lacks the capability to fully manufacture drones and ballistic missiles without smuggling foreign technology through illegal means," he told Al-Fassel.

"This contradicts state media claims about indigenous manufacturing capabilities."

"Disrupting companies that supply weapons parts to the IRGC is crucial to containing Iran's threats across multiple countries," said Iranian affairs expert Fathi al-Sayed of Al-Sharq Center for Regional and Strategic Studies.

"The concern extends beyond arming Iran's military forces to the transfer of these weapons to IRGC proxies across the Middle East, particularly the Houthis in Yemen and Hizbullah in Lebanon," he told Al-Fassel.

-- Samah Abdel Fattah contributed to this report.