Security
US sanctions Iran's ballistic missile, nuclear procurement networks
The three blacklisted networks procured carbon fiber, epoxy resins and other missile-applicable goods for Iran's defense and nuclear industries.
By Al-Fassel |
The United States on March 20 blacklisted three procurement networks based in Iran, Türkiye, Oman and Germany that have supported Iran's ballistic missile, nuclear and defense programs.
These networks have procured carbon fiber, epoxy resins and other missile-applicable goods for Iran's defense industry and for Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA), which is linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.
Among the network's beneficiaries are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), the US Treasury said.
"Through complex covert procurement networks, Iran seeks to supply rogue actors around the world with weapons systems that fuel conflict and risk countless civilian lives," said Treasury official Brian Nelson.
"The United States will continue to use our tools to disrupt these networks and hold accountable those countries that would help proliferate Iran's drones and missiles."
The latest raft of sanctions builds on sanctions imposed June 6 and October 18, 2023 targeting third-country procurement networks supporting the IRGC, MODAFL and their subsidiaries' ballistic missile production.
The new sanctions target a network operated by Germany-based dual Iranian-German national Maziar Karimi, who has procured epoxy resin and other items for IRGC ASF SSJO using a web of intermediaries and front companies.
They target a Türkiye-based carbon fiber procurement network for MODAFL and its subsidiaries, facilitated by Türkiye-based company Gokler Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi and its Türkiye-based managing director, Mahmut Gok.
And they target an Iran and Türkiye-based network involved in proliferation-sensitive composite production and procurement.
Individuals associated with the latter network, Rostam Shahmari Ghojeh Biklo, Pishro Mobtaker Peyvand and Mitra Inanlu, were involved in the procurement of proliferation-sensitive material for Iran's nuclear and military weapons programs.
Excellent