By Al-Fassel | 2025-12-12

Over the past decade, the Iranian regime has relied on proxy groups such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainabiyoun Brigade, Hizbullah, and various Iraqi militias to extend its influence across Syria.

This approach allowed Tehran to avoid direct military involvement while projecting influence through loyal, foreign-based forces.

These groups, supported and fielded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have increasingly shown signs of retreat and are desperately trying to regain ground. This is leading to a major setback following the downfall of the Bashar al-Assad regime.

Tehran's militias in retreat: A disposable asset for Iran

Iran’s proxy strategy centered on militias like the Fatemiyoun Brigade, composed mainly of Afghan Shia recruits, and the Zainabiyoun Brigade, made up of Pakistani Shia fighters.

These groups achieved some successes during the Syrian civil war, helping the Assad regime reclaim key cities including Aleppo, Palmyra, and Raqqa.

At their peak, they mobilized thousands of fighters and were upgraded to division-level units, reflecting their critical role as expendable forces deployed across Syria.

However, after Assad’s decline, many militias abandoned their positions or fled entirely.

Former Fatemiyoun bases, once fortified with IRGC-trained troops, were left deserted.

The rapid collapse highlighted Tehran’s inability to maintain control over its proxies under mounting military pressure and dwindling resources.

Despite clear evidence of retreat, Iranian officials and media often offered contradictory claims of militia resilience.

This breakdown signaled the failure of Iran’s broader "Axis of Resistance" strategy, which sought to use loyal militias as protective shields for Iranian interests.

By depending on forces recruited from vulnerable populations, Tehran struggled to maintain lasting control, and the retreat of its proxies exposed the fragility of its approach.

Limits of Iranian influence

Among Iran’s proxies, Hizbullah had been its most reliable and formidable militia, expanding Tehran’s power in Lebanon and playing a key role in defending Assad in Syria.

Yet even Hizbullah faced setbacks, redeploying forces back to Lebanon and losing influence due to sustained casualties and growing domestic backlash.

Iran’s heavy reliance on Hizbullah overextended the militia’s capabilities across multiple conflicts, ultimately weakening its strategic effectiveness.

Massive Israeli strikes further weakened Hizbullah and other Iranian-backed factions in the region, forcing the Iranian regime to reconsider its dependence on these groups.

By depending on expendable forces recruited from vulnerable populations, Iran failed to cultivate lasting control through its militias.

As these proxies retreated and collapsed, Tehran’s broader influence across the region faced profound decline, raising questions about the long-term viability of Iran’s proxy-based approach.